Wednesday, February 27, 2019

Posts at Uncommon Descent

Here are the posts and comments which Uncommon Descent received for each month from Apr 2005 until Dec 2018. The area of the circles is proportional to the number of views those posts gathered until mid-February 2019 (and most probably starting sometimes in 2011...)

Friday, February 23, 2018

An Amazon Review: Still waiting for the ultimate book on Intelligent Design

I wrote a review at amazon for Dr. Robert J. Marks II's, Dr. Dr. William A. Dembski's, and Dr. Winston Ewert's book Introduction to Evolutionary Informatics (1st Edition):
We are all waiting for the ultimate book on Intelligent Design, written by R. Marks and W. Dembski. Instead we get a "textbook", another attempt to explain the concepts to laymen. I got the impression that the authors used this setting to avoid the necessary rigour: they just do not define terms like "search" which they use hundreds of times. This allows for a lot of hand-waving, like the following sentence on p. 174:

"We note, however, the choice of an algorithm along with its parameters and initialization imposes a probability distribution over the search space"

That unsubstantiated claim is essential for their following proofs on "The Search for a Search"!

And then there are details like this one:

p. 130: "For the Cracker Barrel puzzle [we got] an endogenous information of I = 7.15 bits"
p. 138: "We return now to the Cracker Barrel puzzle. We showed that the endogenous information [...] is I = 7.4 bits"

I tried to solve this conundrum, but I came up with I = 7.8 bits. I contacted the authors, but got no reply.
Not surprisingly, I gave it only two stars.

Some Details on the Cracker Barrel Puzzle

A more complete quote from p. 130 is:
For the Cracker Barrel puzzle, all of the 15 holes are filled with pegs and, at random, a single peg is removed. This starts the game. Using random initialization and random moves, simulation of four million games using a computer program resulted in an estimated win probability p = $0.007\,0$ and an endogenous information of $$I_\Omega = − \log_2\,p\;=\;7.15\,bits.$$
They didn't calculate the correct value, but they simulated the puzzle 4,000,000. A simulation is the most easy programmable way to get a result - but how good is it? It should be pretty good: performing one simulation is a Bernoulli trial with a probability of success $p_t$, the theoretical probability to win a single game by chance. Repeating 4,000,000 Bernoulli trials leads to a binomial experiment $B(4,000,000; p_t)$, so $\sigma = 0.000\,042$ for $p_t$ - that's why stating four positions after the decimal point isn't overconfident: assuming that there is no systemic error, then the probability that the actual value $p_t$ lies within $0.007\,00 \pm 0.000\,05$ is $77\%$.

Giving three significant digits for $I_\Omega$ oversells the power of their experiment slightly: this implies that they expect $p_t$ to be in the interval $[0.007\,067;0.007\,065]$ with a reasonable probability - but the probability is at best about $44\%$.

Confining themselves to only two significant digits on p. 138: $I_\Omega = 7.4\;bits$ yields much more reliable results: again, assuming that there is nothing systematically wrong with their calculation, they can say that $p_t$ is in $[0.005\,72;0.006\,30]$ with a probability of more than $99.999\,99\%$! Well done...

Or not: it is very improbably that both values are correct. Very, very, very, very - using the most favourite estimations, then the second result should only occur with a probability of less than $10^{-98}$ if the first experiment was correctly implemented. It is even worse the other way around: $10^{-112}$.

Which value is correct?

Not surprising the answer: both are wrong - the three authors somehow botched the implementation of even the easiest way to approach the question - a simulation. How can I be so cock-sure? I simulated it myself - 4,000,000 times - and got a value of $p = 0.004\,5$. Then, I calculated the theoretical value by enumerating all possible games and their respective probabilities: again, $p = 0.004\,5$. Then, I published part of my code at The Sceptical Zone, and thankfully, Roy and Corneel also implemented a simulation - which got compatible results. Lastly, Tom English programmed the problem much more cleverly, getting exactly the same results as I (I just had to wait for mine much longer...)

Why didn't the authors do the same?

Monday, January 29, 2018

The Search Problem of William Dembski, Winston Ewert, and Robert Marks

Introduction to Evolutionary Informatics, by Robert J. Marks II, the “Charles Darwin of Intelligent Design”; William A. Dembski, the “Isaac Newton of Information Theory”; and Winston Ewert, the “Charles Ingram of Active Information.” World Scientific, 332 pages.
Classification: Engineering mathematics. Engineering analysis. (TA347)
Subjects: Evolutionary computation. Information technology–Mathematics.1
Search is a central term in the work of Dr. Dr. William Dembski jr, Dr. Winston Ewert, and Dr. Robert Marks II (DEM): it appears in the title of a couple of papers written by at least two of the authors, and it is mentioned hundreds of times in their textbook "Introduction to Evolutionary Informatics". Strangely - and in difference from the other central term information, it is not defined in this textbook, and neither is search problem or search algorithm. Luckily, dozens of examples of searches are given. I took a closer look to find out what DEM see as the search problem in the "Introduction to Evolutionary Informatics" and how their model differs from those used by other mathematicians and scientists.

Thursday, January 18, 2018

Prof. Marks gets lucky at Cracker Barrel

Introduction to Evolutionary Informatics, by Robert J. Marks II, the “Charles Darwin of Intelligent Design”; William A. Dembski, the “Isaac Newton of Information Theory”; and Winston Ewert, the “Charles Ingram of Active Information.” World Scientific, 332 pages.
Classification: Engineering mathematics. Engineering analysis. (TA347)
Subjects: Evolutionary computation. Information technology–Mathematics.1
Yesterday, I looked again through "Introduction to Evolutionary Informatics", when I spotted the Cracker Barrel puzzle in section 5.4.1.2 Endogenous information of the Cracker Barrel puzzle (p. 128). The rules of this variant of a triangular peg-solitaire are described in the text (or can be found at wikipedia's article on the subject). The humble authors then describe a simulation of the game to calculate how probable it is to solve the puzzle using moves at random:
A search typically requires initialization. For the Cracker Barrel puzzle, all of the 15 holes are filled with pegs and, at random, a single peg is removed. This starts the game. Using random initialization and random moves, simulation of four million games using a computer program resulted in an estimated win probability p = 0.0070 and an endogenous information of $$I_\Omega = -\log_2 p = 7.15 bits.$$ Winning the puzzle using random moves with a randomly chosen initialization (the choice of the empty hole at the start of the game) is thus a bit more difficult than flipping a coin seven times and getting seven heads in a row
Naturally, I created such an simulation in R for myself: I encoded all thirty-six moves that could occur in a matrix cb.moves, each row indicating the jumping peck, the peck which is jumped over, and the place on which the peck lands. And here is the little function which simulates a single random game:
cb.simul <- function(pos){
# pos: boolean vector of length 15 indating position of pecks
# a move is allowed if there is a peck at the start position & on the field which is
# jumped over, but not at the final position
allowed.moves <- pos[cb.moves[,1]] & pos[cb.moves[,2]] & (!pos[cb.moves[,3]])
# if now move is allowed, return number of pecks left
if(sum(allowed.moves)==0) return(sum(pos))
# otherwise, chose an allowed move at random
number.of.move <- ((1:36)[allowed.moves])[sample(1:sum(allowed.moves),1)]
pos[cb.moves[number.of.move,]] <- c(FALSE,FALSE,TRUE)
return(cb.simul(pos))
}
I run the simulation 4,000,000 times, changing the start position at random. But as a result, my estimated win probability was $p_e=0.0045$ - only two thirds of the number in the text. How can this be? Why were Prof. Marks et.al. so much luckier than I? I re-run the simulation, checked the code, washed, rinsed, repeated: no fundamental change. So, I decided to take a look at all possible games and on the probability with which they occur. The result was this little routine:
cb.eval <- function(pos, prob){
#pos: boolean vector of length 15 indicating position of pecks
#prob: the probability with which this state occurs # a move is allowed if there is a peck at the start position & on the field which is
#jumped over, but not at the final position
allowed.moves <- pos[cb.moves[,1]] & pos[cb.moves[,2]] & (!pos[cb.moves[,3]])
if(sum(allowed.moves)==0){
#end of a game: prob now holds the probability that this game is played nr.of.pecks <- sum(pos)
#number of remaining pecks cb.number[nr.of.pecks] <<- cb.number[nr.of.pecks]+1
#the number of remaining pecks is stored in a global variable cb.prob[nr.of.pecks] <<- cb.prob[nr.of.pecks] + prob
#the probability of this game is added to the appropriate place of the global variable
return()
}
for(k in 1:sum(allowed.moves)){
#moves are still possible, for each move the next stage will be calculated d <- pos
number.of.move <- ((1:36)[allowed.moves])[k]
d[cb.moves[number.of.move,]] <- c(FALSE,FALSE,TRUE)
cb.eval(d,prob/sum(allowed.moves))
}
}
I now calculated the probabilities for solving the puzzle for each of the fifteen possible starting positions. The result was $$p_s=0.0045 .$$This fits my simulation, but not the one of our esteemed and humble authors! What had happened?

An educated guess

I found it odd that the authors run 4,000,000 simulations - 1.000,000 or 10,000,000 seem to be more commonly used numbers. But when you look at the puzzle, you see that it was not necessary for me to look at all fifteen possible starting positions - whether the first peck is missing in position 1 or position 11 does not change the quality of the game: you could rotate the board and perform the same moves. Using symmetries, you find that there are only four essentially different starting positions. the black, red, and blue group with three positions each, and the green group with six positions. For each group, you get a different probability of success
group blackgreenredblue
prob. of choosing this group .2.4.2.2
prob. of success .00686.00343.00709.001726
One quite obvious explanation for the result of the authors is that they did not run one simulation using a random starting position for 4,000,000 times, but simulated for each of the four groups the game 1,000,000 times. Unfortunately they either did not cumulate their results, but took only the one of the results of the black and the red group (or both), or they only thought they switched starting positions from one group of simulations to the next, but indeed always used the black or the red one.

Is it a big deal?

It is easily corrigible: instead of "For the Cracker Barrel puzzle, all of the 15 holes are filled with pegs and, at random, a single peg is removed." they could write "For the Cracker Barrel puzzle, all of the 15 holes are filled with pegs and, one peck at the tip of the triangle is removed." If the book was actually used as a textbook, the simulation of the Cracker Barrel puzzle is an obvious exercise. I doubt that it is used that way anywhere, so no pupils were annoyed. It is somewhat surprising that such an error occurs: it seems that the program was written by a single contributor and not checked. That seems to have been the case in previous publications, too. Perhaps the authors thought that the program was too simple to be worthy of the full attention - and the more complicated stuff is properly vetted. OTOH, it could be a pattern.... Well, it will certainly be changed in the next edition.

Monday, January 8, 2018

UD in 2017

Just a few pics:

Monday, July 17, 2017

A letter to Winston Ewert

Winston Ewert, Wiliam Dembski, and Robert Marks have written a new book "Introduction to Evolutionary Informatics" Fair to say, I do not like it very much - so I wrote a letter to Winston Ewert, the most accessible of the "humble authors"...
Dear Winston,
congratulations for publishing your first book! It took me some time to get to read it (though I'm always interested in the output of the Evo Lab). Over the last couple of weeks I've discussed your oeuvre on various blogs. I assume that some of you are aware of the arguments at UncommonDescent and TheSkepticalZone, but as those are not peer reviewed papers, the debates may have been ignored. Fair to say, I'm not a great fan of your new book. I'd like to highlight my problems by looking into two paragraphs which irked me during the first reading: In your section about "Loaded Die and Proportional Betting", you write on page 77:
The performance of proportional betting is akin to that of a search algorithm. For proportional betting, you want to extract the maximum amount of money from the game in a single bet. In search, you wish to extract the maximum amount of information in a single query. The mathematics is identical"
This is at odds with the previous paragraphs: proportional betting doesn't optimize a single bet, but a sequence of bets - as you have clearly stated before. I'm well aware of Cover's and Thomas's "Elements of Information Theory", but I fail to say how their chapter on "Gambling and Data Compression" is applicable to your idea of a search. I tried to come up with an example, but if I have to search two equally sized subsets $\Omega_1$ and $\Omega_2$, and the target is to be found in $\Omega_1$ with a probability bigger than to be found in $\Omega_2$, proportional betting isn't the optimal way to go! Does proportional betting really extract the maximum of information in a single guess?

Then there is this following paragraph on page 173:

One’s first inclination is to use an S4S search space populated by different search algorithms such as particle swarm, conjugate gradient descent or Levenberg-Marquardt search. Every search algorithm, in turn, has parameters. Search would not only need to be performed among the algorithms, but within the algorithms over a range of different parameters and initializations. Performing an S4S using this approach looks to be intractable. We note, however, the choice of an algorithm along with its parameters and initialization imposes a probability distribution over the search space. Searching among these probability distributions is tractable and is the model we will use. Our S4S search space is therefore populated by a large number of probability distributions imposed on the search space.
Identifying/representing/translating/imposing a search and a probability distribution is central to your theory. It's quite disappointing that you are glossing over it in your new book! While you give generally a quite extensive bibliography, it is surprising that you do not quote any mechanism which translates the algorithm in a probability distribution.

Therefore I do not know whether you are thinking about the mechanism as described in "Conservation of Information in Search: Measuring the Cost of Success": this one results in every exhaustive search finding its target. Or are you talking about the "representation" in "A General Theory of Information Cost Incurred by Successful Search": here, all exhaustive searches will do on average at best as a single guess (and yes, I think that this in counter-intuitive). As you are talking about $\Omega$ and not any augmented space, I suppose you have the latter in mind...

But if two of your own "representations" result in such a difference between probabilities ($1$ versus $1/|\Omega|$), how can you be comfortable with making such a wide-reaching claim like "each search algorithm imposes a probability distribution over the search space" without further corroboration? Could you - for example - translate the damping parameters of the Levenberg-Marquardt search into such a probability distribution? I suppose that any attempt to do so would show a fundamental flaw in your model: the separation between the optimum of the function and the target....

I'd appreciate if you could address my concerns - at UD, TSZ, or my blog.

Thanks,
Yours Di$\dots$ Eb$\dots$

P.S.: I have to add that I find the bibliographies quite annoying: why can't you add the number of the page if you are citing a book? Sometimes the terms which are accompanied by a footnote cannot be found at all in the given source! It is hard to imagine what the "humble authors" were thinking when they send their interested readers on such a futile search!

Tuesday, February 2, 2016

Some Pies for "The Skeptical Zone"

In 2015, there some 45,000 comments were made at The Skeptical Zone. Here are the top ten of the commentators (just a quantitative, not a qualitative judgement.) I'll stick to the color scheme for all of figures in this post... "The Skeptical Zone" has a handy "reply to"-feature, which allows you to address a previous comments (with or without inline quotation.) It is used to various degree - and though some don't use it at all, nearly 50% of all comments were replies.

Wednesday, January 27, 2016

"Uncommon Descent" and "The Skeptical Zone" in 2015

Since 2005, Uncommon Descent (UD) - founded by William Dembski - has been the place to discuss intelligent design. Unfortunately, the moderation policy has always been one-sided (and quite arbitrary at the same time!) Since 2011, the statement "You don't have to participate in UD" is not longer answered with gritted teeth only, but with a real alternative: Elizabeth Liddl's The Skeptical Zone (TSZ). So, how were these two sites doing in 2015?

Number of Comments 2005 - 2015

year 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
UD  8,400 23,000 22,400 23,100 41,100 24,800 41,400 28,400 42,500 53,700 53,100
TSZ - - - - - -  2,200 15,100 16,900 20,400 45,200
In 2015, there were still 17% more comments at UD than at TSZ.

Tuesday, January 26, 2016

The "Discovery Institute" trembles before the mighty powers of DiEbLog!

Just kidding. It isn't. But they published some of the pages the absence of which I had criticized in my previous post: John G. West wrote an article on Dennis Prager Was Right: Atheists Are More Open-Minded on ID than Some United Methodist Officials, in which he included further pages from the poll which the Discovery Institute (DI) had ordered on the subject of being snubbed by the United Methodist Church.

I assume that this little blog mainly flies under the RADAR of the DI, but they most probably follow astutely the very amusing Sensuous Curmudgeon, where I raised the problem earlier.

So, as I have guessed there was a question Q9, regarding the religious beliefs of the participants of the study. Why did the DI need an extra day to put a spin on the answers to this questions? Did they think it to be especially juicy, so that they were able to get yet another article from it? Or were they annoyed that one third of the participants of the poll identified themselves as agnostic or atheists?

Let's wait and see for Q8 - the question for the degree of education. Perhaps some scientists named Steve were involved, that result could be unpleasant...

OMG - The Discovery Institute is Committing Censorship!!!11!!1!

Does the Discovery Institute (DI) want to keep its much coveted Censor of the Year Award for itself this year?

If you are interested in this kind of things, you will have noticed the tantrum John G. West and his friends are collectively throwing over at Evolution News & views (EN&V) because they were somewhat rebuffed by the United Methodist Church (UMC). Here is some background as it presents itself to me (EN&V's viewpoint may differ): The UMC is holding its ''General Conference'' once every four years. In May 2016, it will be taking place at the ''Oregon Convention Center''. ''Sponsors and exhibitioners'' may rent booths at the center to present themselves to the estimated 6,500 participants of the event. The DI was willing to pay the 900 Dollar - 1200 Dollar fee to become an exhibitioner, but their application was turned down. There may have been various problems, but unfortunately for them, it did not seem to match the fourth criterium for eligibility:

Proven Business Record: Purchasers must have a proven business record with their products/services/resources. Exhibits are not to provide a platform to survey or test ideas; rather, to provide products/services/resources which are credible and proven.
It is fair to say that the DI has not recovered from this blow yet- over the last eight days, there have been at least fourteen articles been published on this matter at EN&V. One of the highlights was this New Poll: Most Americans Turn Thumbs Down on United Methodist Ban on Intelligent Design: The DI spent the money it has saved on the booth to have a survey performed by SurveyMonkey. It asked:
The United Methodist Church recently banned a group from renting an information table at the Church’s upcoming general conference because the group supports intelligent design—the idea that nature is the product of purposeful design rather than an unguided process. Some have criticized the ban as contrary to the United Methodist Church’s stated commitment to encourage “open hearts, open minds, open doors.” Rate your level of agreement or disagreement with the following statements:
1. The United Methodist Church should not have banned an intelligent design group from renting an information table at its conference.
2. The United Methodist Church’s ban on the intelligent design group seems inconsistent with the Church’s stated commitment to encourage “open hearts, open minds, open doors.”
What surprised me: thought the question was obviously leading, still 30% didn't agree with the first statement and 22% didn't agree with the second one! Or, as the DI describes it:
More than 70% of the 1,946 respondents to the nationwide survey agreed that “the United Methodist Church should not have banned an intelligent design group from renting an information table at its conference.” More than 78% of respondents agreed that “the United Methodist Church’s ban on the intelligent design group seems inconsistent with the Church’s stated commitment to encourage ‘open hearts, open minds, open doors.’”
But here is the cinch: Though EN&V announced that the "full report" can be downloaded from here, it is obvious from the pagination that at least two pages are missing!

Enter panic mode: OMG! The Discovery Instituted is censoring its report! What are they covering up? Are they beating puppies? Like Darwin! They should get their own Censorship Award!!!!11!!1

The truth is a little bit less sinister: Survey Monkey asks you about your age (Q11), your gender (Q12), your income (Q13), your party affiliation (Q10) and the region you are living in (Q14). What is surprisingly missing are questions about your religious orientation and your education. These two characteristics are of obvious interest for a poll like this one - so, I am guessing that the questions Q8 and Q9 were about these matters. Maybe the results did not please the DI and thus, were omitted from the final report.

Edit: Instead of trying to claim that it was meant to be ironic, I just corrected an embarrassing spelling mistake in the headline...

Sunday, May 31, 2015

Uncommon Descent in Numbers - 2nd edition

Three years ago, I put up some pictures showing the number of comments and threads at Uncommon Descent. Now seems to be a good occasion to up-date some of this information.

1. Google Trends

Look for yourself: The phrase Uncommon Descent was most searched for in 2008. After that, everybody had bookmarked the site, so further googling became unnecessary. The same holds true for The Panda's Thumb - both sites are equally popular...

2. Threads per Month

The number of new threads per month peaked in 2011, but is still on a high level - though it seems to be decreasing. What makes all the difference is "News" - a.k.a. Denyse O'Leary - adding her news items. While in 2011/2012, those often were left uncommented, since 2013, they attract the attention of her fellow editors (though I got the impression that some commentators use them for their off-topic-remarks, while others just cannot let the copious factual inaccuracies stand uncommented.)

Monday, May 25, 2015

The Natural Probability on M(Ω)

Two weeks ago, Dr. Winston Ewert announced at Uncommon Descent a kind of open mike. He put up a page at Google Moderator and asked for questions. Unfortunately, not many took advantage of this offer, but I added three questions from the top of my head. The experience made me revisit the paper A General Theory of Information Cost Incurred by Successful Search again, and when I tried - as usual - to construct simple examples, I run into further questions - so, here is another one:

In their paper, the authors W. Dembski, W. Ewert, and R. Marks (DEM) talk about something they call the natural probability:

Processes that exhibit stochastic behavior arise from what may be called a natural probability. The natural probability characterizes the ordinary stochastic behavior of the process in question. Often the natural probability is the uniform probability. Thus, for a perfect cube with distinguishable sides composed of a rigid homogenous material (i.e., an ordinary die), the probability of any one of its six sides landing on a given toss is 1/6. Yet, for a loaded die, those probabilities will be skewed, with one side consuming the lion’s share of probability. For the loaded die, the natural probability is not uniform.
This natural probability on the search space translates through their idea of lifting to the space of measures $\mathbf{M}(\Omega)$:
As the natural probability on $\Omega$, $\mu$ is not confined simply to $\Omega$ lifts to $\mathbf{M}(\Omega)$, so that its lifting, namely $\overline{\mu}$, becomes the natural probability on $\mathbf{M}(\Omega)$ (this parallels how the uniform probability $\mathbf{U}$, when it is the natural probability on $\Omega$, lifts to the uniform probability $\overline{\mathbf{U}}$ on $\mathbf{M}(\Omega)$, which then becomes the natural probability for this higher-order search space).
As usual, I look at an easy example: a loaded coin which always shows head. So $\Omega=\{H,T\}$ and $\mu=\delta_H$ is the natural measure on $\Omega$. What happens on $\mathbf{M}(\Omega)= \{h\cdot\delta_H + t\cdot\delta_T|0 \le h,t \le 1; h+t=1 \}$? Luckily, $$(\mathbf{M}(\{H,T\}),\mathbf{U}) \cong ([0,1],\lambda).$$ Let's jump the hoops:
  1. The Radon-Nikodym derivative of $\delta_H$ with respect to $\mathbf{U}$ is $f(H) = \frac{d\delta_H}{d\mathbf{U}}(H) = 2$, $f(T) = \frac{d\delta_H}{d\mathbf{U}}(T) = 0$
  2. Let $\theta \in \mathbf{M}(\{H,T\})$, i.e., $\theta= h\delta_H + t\delta_T$. Then$$\overline{f}{(\theta)} = \int_{\Omega} f(x)d\theta(x)$$ $$=f(H)\cdot\theta(\{H\}) + f(T) \cdot\theta(\{T\})$$ $$=2 \cdot h$$
Here, I have the density of my natural measure on $\mathbf{M}(\Omega)$ with regard to $\overline{\mathbf{U}}$, $$d\overline{\delta_H}(h\cdot\delta_H + t\cdot\delta_T) = 2 \cdot h \cdot d\overline{\mathbf{U}}(h\cdot\delta_H + t\cdot\delta_T).$$ But what is it good for? For the uniform probability, DEM showed the identity $$\mathbf{U}=\int_{\mathbf{M}(\Omega)}\theta d\overline{\mathbf{U}} .$$ Unfortunately, for $\int_{\mathbf{M}(\Omega)}\theta d\overline{\delta_H}$, I get nothing similar: $$\int_{\mathbf{M}(\Omega)}\theta d\overline{\delta_H} = \frac{2}{3}\delta_H + \frac{1}{3}\delta_T$$

So, again, what does this mean? Wouldn't the Dirac delta function be a more natural measure on $\mathbf{M}(\Omega)$?

I hope that Dr. Winston Ewert reacts to all of the questions before Google Moderator shuts down for good on June 30, 2015...

Monday, May 11, 2015

Five Years of "The Search for a Search"

The Journal of Advanced Computational Intelligence and Intelligent Informatics published the paper The Search for a Search: Measuring the Information Cost of Higher Level Search of William A. Dembski and Robert J. Marks II (DM) in its July edition in 2010. With the five year jubilee of the publication coming, it seems to be appropriate to revisit a pet peeve of mine...

(Shell game performed on Karl-Liebknecht-Straße in Berlin, photograph by E.asphys)

Imagine a shell game. You have observed the con artist for a while, and now you know:

  1. The pea ends up under each of the three shells (left, middle, and right) with the same probability, i.e., $$P(Pea=left)=P(Pea=middle)=P(Pea=right)=1/3$$
  2. If the pea ends up under the left or the middle shell, you are able to track its way. So, in these cases, you will find the pea with probability 1 $$P(Finding\,Pea|Pea=left)=P(Finding\,Pea|Pea=middle)=1$$
  3. However, if the pea ends up under the right shell, in 999 times out 1000, you make a mistake during your tracking and be convinced that it is under the left or the middle shell - the probability of finding this pea is 1/1000$$P(Finding\,Pea|Pea=right)=1/1000$$

You are invited to play the game. Should you use your knowledge (method $M_1$), or should you chose a shell at random (method $M_2)$?

Sunday, September 28, 2014

Conservation of Information in Evolutionary Search - Talk by William Dembski - part 5

For an introduction to this post, take a look here. As I ended part 4 quite abruptly, this section starts in the middle of things....

Part 4: 45' 00" - 52' 50"

Topics: What is Conservation of Information? Example continued.

William Dembski: These tickets have probability 1/2, 1/2, 1/2, 1/2, and this one ticket has probability 1. If I happen to get this ticket, I have probability 1/2 of choosing curtain 1, but it is also probability 1/9 of getting that ticket. When you run the numbers, at the end of the day, by using these tickets, I'm not better of than I was originally. It is still only a probability of 1/3 of finding curtain 1, of finding the prize there. Once one factors in how did I limit myself to these tickets in the first place. Going from this whole space to this, that is information intensive. I have ruled out certain possibilities, that incurs an information cost. As I said, the cost is 5/9. It is really just an accounting thing. That is what conservation of information is. Once you factor in the information that it takes to get the search, get a search which has improved the probability for finding your original target, we haven't gained anything. It is called Conservation of Information, as the problem can even get worse. At this case, we have broken even, we are back to 1/3 for the probability of getting the prize, but let's say, you really want to improve the probability, you want to guarantee that you get that prize with this tickets. Well, then you have got only one ticket that will work for you.

Conservation of Information in Evolutionary Search - Talk by William Dembski - part 4

For an introduction to this post, take a look here.

Part 4: 31' 25" - 45' 00"

( I had to pause at 45', there is such an elementary mistake in Dembski's math, it was just to funny...)

Topics: What is Conservation of Information?

William Dembski: Now let us get to the heart of things "Conservation of Information". What is that conservation? Let me put on the next slide.

William Dembski: This is probably the most gem-packed slide in this talk. I want to make a distinction between -what I call - probable and improbable events, and probable and improbable searches. An improbable event is just something that is high in improbability: flip a coin a thousand times, get a thousand heads in a row. Highly improbable. It happens: if you believe in a multi-universe, then there is a universe where this is happening, where someone like me is speaking, my double-ganger flips a coin over the next hour and sees 1000 heads in a row. Probable and improbable search, that is where what is the probability that a search is successful. It is not so much asking whether it actually succeeds, it is not concerned with the result. It is concerned with the probability distribution associated with the search. This is an important distinction because so many intelligent design arguments look for a discontinuity in the evolutionary process. We look for highly improbable events. Such as the intelligent design people: you get for instance Thomas Nagel's "Mind and Cosmos". He is basically looking at probabilistic miracles. Think how the origin of life undercuts a materialistic understanding of biology. So he is looking into improbable events. That is what we do when we try to find evidence for a discontinuity. What I'm doing in this talk is saying, look, I'm going to give you evolution, give you common ancestry, all of that. That is no problem. What I'm interested though is the probability of success for a search.

member of the audience: What are we searching for?

William Dembski: It is whatever the target happens to be.

Saturday, September 27, 2014

Conservation of Information in Evolutionary Search - Talk by William Dembski - part 3

For an introduction to this post, take a look here. There is some interaction with the audience (15'30" - 18'00") which I wasn't able to understand fully. Any help is appreciated!

Part 3: 12' 45" - 31' 25"

Topics: What is an evolutionary search?

William Dembski: Now let's add this next term evolutionary. What does evolutionary - when we put it in front of search - add to the discussion? I think it changes one key aspect here. Whereas we were looking at some query feedback, now this query feedback takes the form of fitness: how good is it? Query feedback can be quite general. Maybe the query feedback is nothing, when we examine it. Or maybe the query feedback may just say "I'm in the target" or "I'm not in the target". That would be very simple. Fitness is going to give some sort of range of values that ideally identify how close am I to the target.

William Dembski: There are examples of evolutionary search. There is the Dawkins' weasel example from his book "The Blind Watchmaker", that is the one I'm going to focus on here. Then there are various - what I would regard as - embellishments of that, because I don't think that there is anything fundamentally new about them. There is MSU's Avida program, Tom Ray's Tierra, Schneider's ev. What is at the heart of these programs that these are computer programs which mimic - try to mimic - Darwinian evolutionary processes. What are they supposed to show? That is interesting. Look at the history of this field of evolutionary computing and there is a reason why people wanted to do evolution in the computer. That is because the computer would allow evolution to be done in real time, because we cannot really see it in real time in the wild.

Friday, September 26, 2014

Conservation of Information in Evolutionary Search - Talk by William Dembski - part 2

For an introduction to this post, take a look here. This is quite a short section, with some annotations from me.

Part 2: 09' 40" - 12' 45''

Topics: What is a search?

William Dembski: We talked about information. Let's now look at that second key term "Search". What is a search. There are seven key components in a search.

William Dembski: You have a search space, you have a target - we are looking for something in the search space. There is initialization - where do we start off? There is a query limit - how many things in the search space can we check out? There is query feedback - when we have checked out, when we have located some item - what is it telling us about itself in terms of how it relates to the target? There is an update rule - once we have queried something, what do we query next? And then finally a stop criterion - when do we stop? How do we know that we have done enough? This is very general.

Thursday, September 25, 2014

Conservation of Information in Evolutionary Search - Talk by William Dembski - part 1

For an introduction to this post, take a look here.

Part 1: 00' 00" - 09' 40''

Topics: Introduction, What is information?

Leo Kadanoff: [???] He went on to broader interests in subjects including information theory, philosophy and parts of biology. The best write-up I could find about him was the Discovery Institute's write-up on the web: "mathematician philosopher William A. Dembski is senior fellow with the Discovery Institute. He has taught at the Northwestern University, the University of Notre Dame, and the University of Dallas. He has done postdoctoral work in mathematics at MIT, in physics in Chicago, and in computer science at Princeton. He is a graduate of the University of Illinois, of the University of Chicago, and of Princeton.
His fields include mathematics, physics and philosophy, as well as theology. We probably hear only a fraction of those interests today in his talk about the "Creation of Information in Evolutionary Search".

William Dembski: Okay, well, Leo, it is a pleasure to be back here. Leo was my adviser back in 87/88, along with Patrick Billingsley and [???]. The topic is actually "Conservation of Information in Evolutionary Search. I want to speak about that

Leo Kadanoff: I said creation! [???]

William Dembski: I'm called a creationist enough, so I make that distinction when I can. What I will describe is the work that I have done with the Evolutionary Informatics Lab - this is their website.

William Dembski's talk at the University of Chicago

Invited by Leo Kadanoff, William Dembski spoke on Aug 15, 2014 at the University of Chicago's "Computations in Science" seminar. Jerry A. Coyne - a professor in the department of ecology and evolution at the same university - questioned the judgement of the seminar's organizers. Afterwards, the Discovery Institute was very pleased with its paladin William Dembski.
"The talk itself and the Q&A afterward, which were at a pretty high level, went very well."
, and they loved a concluding remark by Leo Kadanoff:
I think the ball is in the court of people who believe in evolution. They have to deal with these questions. ...Bill has made his case and we should all go home and think.
At William Dembski's former blog Uncommon Descent, a video of the talk-cum-questions was posted on Sep 14, 2014:

This video has gotten very little resonance. To make it easier to access, I have created a transcript, which I will publish on this blog in a short series of posts. Obviously, the usual caveats apply: I'm not a native speaker, but I tried my best to understand and reproduce the talk as truthfully as possible. I apologize in advance for my errors, which inevitably have occurred, and I'm grateful for any correction.

How "official" is the video?

The question arose: who actually taped the talk? Some student, who then put it up on youtube? I think that it is a work of members of the Discovery Institute:
  1. The youtube channel MissIngaNiball on which the video is presented seems to belong to Robert Marks (wikipedia, American Loons), or at least a member of his family (in which case a predilection for feeble puns would be hereditary).
  2. Two stills taken from the video are credited to Paul Nelson (wikipedia, American Loons)in the Discovery Institute's article.

Dembski's talk: Part 1 - 5

Sunday, July 14, 2013

Dembski's, Ewert's and Marks's Concept of a Search Applied to Exhaustive Searches

At Uncommon Descent, Winston Ewert, co-author of the paper A General Theory of Information Cost Incurred by Successful Search, writes:
"The search is defined to be a six-tuple consisting of the initiator, terminator, inspector, navigator, nominator, and discriminator. The paper studies the question of picking a search at random, and that would imply picking each of the six components at random. We did not consider it necessary to specifically state that each individual component was also selected at random. That would seem to be implied.
So, let $\Omega = \{\omega_1, \omega_2, \dots, \omega_N\}$ be our finite search space with $N$ elements. We are looking for a single element $\omega_k$, so we try to maximize the fitness function $f = \chi_{\omega_k}$. To keep everything finite, we don't allow repetitions, i.e., in our search each place can only be visited once. This is - as Macready and Wolpert observed - always possible by keeping a look-up table and thus doesn't change the set-up. Therefore, our search is completed in at most $N$ steps.
(BTW: The claim that "each of the six components [is picked] at random" seems not to apply to the inspector: this is a fixed function for a search - in our case, the inspector returns the value of the fitness function. Of course, you can say that we pick the inspector at random out of the set of the one possible inspector.)
Let's take a look at all the searches which are ended by their terminator only after the $N$-s step, i.e., the subset of all exhaustive searches. The price question: What is the probability to find the target in such an exhaustive search? Until now, everyone looking at such problems would have thought that this probability is one: we certainly visited $\omega_k$ and spotted that the function $f$ takes it maximum there. But in the world of Dembski, Ewert, and Marks it is not, as a random discriminator takes its toll - and discriminators aren't obliged to return the target if it was found and identified...
Counterintuitive? That is a flattering description: the discriminator's purpose seems to be to turn even a search which is successful by all human standards into a guess to fit the idée fixe that each search can be "represented" by a measure on the search space.
Addendum: We can drop the condition of not having repetitions in our searches and just look at those searches which are terminated only after the whole search space was visited: terminators with this property exist. Such searches may have length $N$, but can be much longer. The result is the same: the probability of finding the target during a complete enumeration of the search space is (much) less than one. I have to ask: What good is a model in which an exhaustive search doesn't fare much better than a single guess?